Utah Welfare Reform Reauthorization Round Table

    By October 2002, Congress must reauthorize the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program, established as part of its 1996 Welfare Reform Law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). The Child Care and Development Block Grant, the Food Stamp program, Transitional Medicaid, and Abstinence Education are additional components of PRWORA due for reauthorization this year. ⁽¹⁾ PRWORA also made changes in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) eligibility, child support enforcement, child protection, and ended eligibility of most legal immigrants for most public benefits.

    Most observers predict that the basic parameters of the law will be retained, but what has been learned during these first five years will trigger discussion about some important refinements for the next phase of welfare reform, especially as the economy has turned down. Among the issues that are likely to be discussed are funding, state flexibility, wages and benefits for working families, interventions for families with multiple barriers to employment and functioning, family supports, and the impact of welfare reform on child well-being. Reauthorization discussions on all of these topics offer opportunities for a broad range of groups and individuals to consider where welfare reform should go in the coming years and to convey their views to law-makers who will be making key decisions. ⁽²⁾

I. Three Decades of Welfare Reform in Utah: The Quest for Self-Reliance

     Utah has a long history of struggling to convert the welfare system from a construct of policies and practices trapping single-parent families in dependency and severe poverty to a supportive stepping stone to self-reliance. Thirty years ago, serious policy discussions centered on reducing systemic disincentives to work found in rules for Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Medicaid, Food Stamps, and other supports. Even for welfare parents with the best skills and greatest chances to succeed, working put families in greater jeopardy than did welfare, in terms of meeting basic needs and raising children.

    In 1974, Utah implemented the "Working Pays" program to reduce the dramatic "cliff" of lost benefits for working welfare families. When a single-parent family earned income under AFDC, the amount of their grant was automatically reduced (as were benefits in other programs, such as Food Stamps). The centerpiece of the Working Pays program was a federally allowable earned income disregard provision called "30+1/3." "30+1/3" disregarded $30 plus 1/3 of the remaining income and based the grant on that. This raised the family's disposable income above the grant amount.

    Policy makers also recognized the critical importance of transitional supports. Knowing that many welfare recipients would not obtain employer-provided health care benefits, they extended Medicaid coverage for four months beyond AFDC case closure due to work. In 1977, the Utah Legislature appropriated nearly $2.5 million to allow eligibility for child care assistance to be extended to low-income working families. Discussions about the benefits of employer-sponsored child care solutions began in earnest.

    Utah's early self-sufficiency efforts also involved the federal Working Incentive (WIN) training program, run in Utah by the Department of Employment Security. WIN was established in 1967 to provide training to parents-both male and female-on AFDC/AFDC-U ⁽³⁾ . All parents whose youngest child was at least six were required to participate in WIN, unless they were disabled or already working. However, in Utah, the extra help of the "Working Pays" program was partially responsible for a large number of single-parent voluntary participants with children under six. Studies showed that placement wages after training were very low, but some parents were able to move ahead with this help.

    President Jimmy Carter's 1977 Welfare Reform proposal was greeted with great interest against this backdrop. Promoting work and self-sufficiency by eliminating some work disincentives and expanding the Earned Income Tax Credit were two featured provisions that coincided with what Utah was doing.

    As the decade ended, Utah's Governor Matheson initiated the "Jobs as an Alternative to Welfare Program." The effort involved increased child care assistance to working families and opened up state Class C (entry level) jobs to welfare recipients. The Governor also proclaimed that Utah AFDC grant levels would automatically receive a cost-of-living increase along with state employee salaries, and took steps to improve cooperation between assistance workers in the Utah Departments of Social Services (DSS) and Employment Security (Job Service).

    By the early 1980s, AFDC caseloads across the nation were climbing, prompting the Reagan Administration to take action to stem costs. States were prohibited from utilizing the "30+1/3" income disregard beyond four months and the WIN program focus was shifted away from job training to immediate placement. Simultaneously, Utah's failing economy triggered revenue shortfalls and high unemployment. The Utah Legislature sought to save money by eliminating the AFDC-U program in 1981.⁽⁴⁾

    Seeking solutions from within the state, community and client organizations worked with DSS to implement the "Self-sufficiency Program" in 1983. This innovative program turned on a partnership between client and agency "Self-sufficiency Workers" who helped assess employment barriers and direct clients to necessary supportive and intervention services intended to enhance their employability and bolster their efforts. Child support, employment, child care, medical care, and adequate grant levels were all emphasized. By mid-decade, the vast majority of AFDC parents were working or involved in self-sufficiency activities. The number of AFDC parents with earnings doubled in two years. The Utah Legislature responded with increased FY1986 funding and passed legislation in a number of critical areas. A successful strategy was devised to reinstate a limited form of financial assistance for two-parent families. Called the Emergency Work Program (EWP), both parents were required to engage in work activities and the program only ran during the winter months. Despite steps forward, though, federal funding cutbacks and another economic slump soon led to a waning of Legislative support for the Self-sufficiency Program and efforts to extend EWP year-round failed.

    As Congress debated welfare reform legislation leading to the Family Support Act of 1988, Utah embarked on its own approach-a demonstration program to be tested in Davis County. Carrying forward the employment planning component of the old "Self-sufficiency Program," Utah turned for the first time to waivers of federal regulations, seeking to obtain permission to "break" some of the most egregious work disincentives. The waiver package was never approved, however, since in 1989, Utah was busy implementing the Family Support Act (FSA).

    The FSA embodied a federal welfare reform that coupled stronger child support collection mechanisms with mandatory employment activities for certain target groups of parents under the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills (JOBS) program. It required states to provide employment activities similar to those Utah had already been providing, e.g., certain self-sufficiency (job training, education, on-the-job-training, job readiness and search); supportive services (child care and transportation); and transitional services (transitional child care and Medicaid coverage). The Act also attempted to reduce work disincentives by reducing the impact of increased income on other assistance program benefits. Assessment was mandatory, as was the development of and compliance with an employment plan, reminiscent of one of the key waivers sought for the Davis Country pilot project. Specific sanctions (grant reductions) were to be applied for non-participation. DSS administration announced that Utah would approach the Family Support Act as a way to reduce poverty.

    However, the vast majority of ways that federal rules discouraged or punished work were left untouched by the Family Support Act; in 1993, Utah again looked to federal waivers to modify its family assistance system. As part of the Single Parent Employment Demonstration (SPED) program, the Department of Human Services applied for over 40 waivers of federal rules in AFDC, Medicaid, and Food Stamps. SPED was approved and operated from 1993 to 1996 in one Salt Lake office, St. George, and Roosevelt. It was extended statewide in 1996 and ran for one year until 1997, when the federal TANF program was implemented in Utah as the Family Employment Program (FEP).

    The goal of SPED was to reduce family poverty by increasing income. To that end, the critical components of SPED were the following:

• Universal Participation: by expanding the definition of allowable self-sufficiency activities to include options such as mental health counseling, substance abuse treatment, and parenting classes, nearly all SPED clients participated in their individualized plans for self-sufficiency.
• Self-sufficiency First: prior to eligibility determination, planning for employment or addressing barriers began between the client and a Self-sufficiency worker.
• Diversion: one-time payments and support services were offered to applicants to allow them to avoid enrolling in AFDC.
• Support for Active Participation: high levels of self-sufficiency activity, usually defined as earning income, were rewarded with an incentive grant payment of $40 per month and additional Food Stamps to help offset costs of employment.
• Child Support Focus: the Office of Recovery Services and the Office of Family Support cooperated to collect legally due child support to help the family increase income.
• Continued Support for Employed Parents: working participants were rewarded with effecitve, simplified income disregards and employment support services. At the point of termination from financial assistance due to income exceeding eligibility limits, families were offered transitional employment support, child care, and 24 months of extended Medicaid eligibility.
• Problem Resolution/Conciliation Process: the purpose of this process is to underscore the principle that participation was a goal, not client coercion or case closure. It involved a three stage process wherein both client and Department activities were reviewed and efforts were made to discover and assist with any client or family barriers affecting participation. A $100 grant reduction was applied only after certain steps were documented. Case closure occurred after the final phase of interactions without resolutuion. The sanction was curable, in most cases, as soon as participation resumed.
• Policy/Program Simplification to Support Employment: SPED focused on self-sufficiency rather than eligibility.
• Coordination with Community Resources: allied public and private agencies were systematically involved with SPED, including in policy formulation. ⁽⁵⁾

    The evaluation of SPED affirmed the changes in philosophy and operations. The statewide caseload was declining anyway, in response to the improving economy, but the SPED caseload declined more quickly, more case closures were due to increased income, and family earnings went up for those still enrolled in the program⁽⁶⁾ . In 1996, determined to replace AFDC in Utah with a statewide program based on SPED, the Department of Human Services worked with community groups and legislators to draft and pass a bill to that effect. Although a bill passed that was largely faithful to SPED policies, legislators inserted a 36-month lifetime limit in the bill. Utah's time limit is more stringent than all but 16 other states.

II. 1996 Welfare Reform - Congress's Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA)

    Congressional passage of PRWORA constitutes the most monumental change to the nation's social welfare system since its inception during the Great Depression. It repealed the most central feature of that system, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)-an entitlement program-and replaced it with the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program-a block grant-providing a capped amount of funding to states and allowing them considerable discretion in designing their programs. It also modified funding and rules in federal employment, child care, child support, education, training, and nutrition assistance programs used by families with dependent children and others, including the unemployed, the underemployed, the marginally employed, and the unemployable.

    PRWORA reduced the role of the federal government in the nation's welfare system. The reduction was financial, accomplished by block granting TANF and time limiting family eligibility; as well as by restricting eligibility for Supplemental Security Income for some 100,000 children, people in substance abuse programs, and around 500,000 legal immigrants; and reducing both eligibility for and allotments in the Food Stamp program. ⁽⁷⁾

PRWORA allows states to spend federal TANF funds in "any manner that is reasonably calculated" to accomplish the purposes of TANF:

"The purpose of this part [of the law] is to increase the flexibility of States in operating a program designed to---

1 . provide assistance to needy families so that the children may be cared for in their homes or in the homes of relatives;

2. end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage;

3. prevent and reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence of these pregnancies; and

4. encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families."

PRWORA also reduced federal regulatory involvement in state financial assistance programs under TANF, devolving the authority to make many policy decisions to the states. However, PRWORA does include federal mandates, as well as provisions that give strong direction to states. In brief, PRWORA . . .

• block grants federal monies for states to run "Work First" financial assistance programs for five years in the amount of $16.6 billion annually (without an inflation adjustment);
• implements a 60-month lifetime limit on the receipt of federally-funded financial assistance for most families;
• allows states to exempt no more than 20 percent of the average annual caseload from time limits due to hardship;
• prohibits the use of federal funds to serve certain categories of families, such as those headed by a teen parent, unless she is living with her parents or in other approved circumstances; and most legal immigrants;
• implements family work participation requirements;
• levies financial penalties against states for failure to achieve certain, progressively higher work participation rates (by FY2000, 40 percent of single-parent families were required to participate for 30 or more hours per week and 90 percent of two-parent families, for 35 or more hours per week);
• specified that the only "countable" activities for the purpose of meeting work participation rates are "unsubsidized or subsidized employment, on-the-job training, work experience, community service, [up to] 12 months of vocational training [for a limited percentage of the state's TANF caseload], or providing child care services to individuals who are participating in community service," plus a limited number of weeks for job search, and teen-parent participation in secondary school for a limited percentage of the caseload;" ⁽⁸⁾
• provides incentives for states to ensure that high percentages of the caseload are in "countable" work activities;

• requires states to deny or terminate assistance if certain performance requirements are not met by applicant or recipient parents;

• places a high priority on family formation, including by providing financial incentives for states to reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies without increased abortion rates;
• provides incentives to states to reduce caseloads;
• requires states to spend a certain amount of state funds each year (called state Maintenance of Effort or MOE);
• provides Supplemental Grants to states with historically low per-child financial assistance expenditures or having rapid population growth;
• establishes a capped Contingency Fund and a loan fund to help states respond in the event of increased need attending economic downturn.

    PRWORA also combined three existing, federally-funded child care programs into the Child Care and Development Block Grant (CCDBG). This funding can be used to help cover child care costs for both TANF-eligible and low-income working families not receiving TANF financial assistance. States can also transfer up to 30% of their TANF funds into their child care funding stream. PRWORA devolved regulatory issues such as quality of care and health and safety to the states.

    There was an unsuccessful attempt to block grant the Medicaid program as part of PRWORA. Medicaid remains an entitlement with categorical eligibility. A new category was added, Transitional Medical Assistance (TMA). Medicaid is not time-limited. Families with dependent children remain eligible for Medicaid, even if sanctioned (in most cases) or if they lose financial assistance due to time limits, as long as they would have met eligibility criteria for AFDC in August 1996.⁽⁹⁾

III. Welfare Reform - Utah's FEP

    The Department of Workforce Services (DWS), created in 1996 and the administering agency for the Family Employment Program (FEP), asserts as FEP's purpose "to empower families to increase their income and become self-sufficient through employment, child support, and/or disability benefits." Utah statute for the program provides as the purpose, ". . . to assist a parent client to obtain employment that is sufficient to sustain a family, to ensure the dignity of those receiving assistance, and to strengthen families." Key FEP policy provisions are the following:

Employment plans and participation requirements

• Universal participation that begins almost immediately after enrollment with a mandatory assessment (of at least family circumstances, educational background, work history, skills, and barriers to attaining self-sufficiency) for each client and the development of a negotiated employment plan by the employment counselor and client.
• Employment plan client activities may include a broad range of activities to move the client towards employment, such as job search, high school completion, education or training necessary to obtain employment, assisting the Department in enforcing child support collection, and treatment for mental health or substance abuse problems.
• Employment plan DWS services may include cash assistance and supportive services such as child care, assistance obtaining education, training, and case management.
• Under most circumstances, education and training are restricted to a maximum of 24 months beyond high school completion.

Time limits

• The receipt of FEP assistance for single-parent families is limited to 36 months in a parent's lifetime.
• Extensions to Utah's 36-month time limit and the federal 60-month time limit for a number constituting up to 20 percent of the average annual caseload can be granted.⁽¹⁰⁾
• Extensions to Utah's time limit can be granted on a month-by-month basis for up to 24 additional months to families headed by a parent who has worked at least 80 hours per month during the 36^th month and six other months of the previous 24 (these extensions are not counted under the 20 percent of caseload rule).
• Two-parent families in the Working Towards Employment Program (WTEP) are restricted to 24 months (recently reduced from 36 months) in a lifetime; they may be enrolled seven of 18 months. One parent must perform 32 hours of community work and eight hours of job search per week; the second parent must participate in work activities for 20 hours per week. Payment is made after performance and case closure results from non-participation.

Sanctions and conciliation

• DWS can terminate part or all of cash assistance if the client fails to comply with her employment plan without due cause.
• A "Conciliation Process" is followed when a case manager perceives a participation problem. The conciliation process has three goals: 1) to encourage participation, 2) to ensure that the client is able to make an informed choice about participation and cooperation requirements before adverse action is taken, and 3) to confirm that DWS workers and other appropriate parties have followed a uniform set of procedures and utilized appropriate resources to assist clients in resolving participation difficulties. The skills of a specialized worker-generally a trained Social Worker-are highly recommended in that policy to increase the likelihood that hidden barriers are discovered and appropriate interventions provided.

Eligibility

• To receive FEP assistance, a teen parent must live with her family or in an approved situation; participate in education for parenting and life skills, infant and child wellness programs; and attend high school, participate in education or training, work, or participate in a combination of employment and education or training for no less than 20 hours per week.
• FEP eligibility is extended to legal immigrants.
• FEP and Food Stamp eligibility is extended to persons convicted of a felony involving a controlled substance, if they are receiving treatment for their drug dependency and making progress under certain definitions.
• The asset limit for FEP is $2,000 per household; $8,000 equity value is allowed on one car.

Income disregards

• Income disregards for working recipients include $100 of income, up to $50 per month to defray the impact of automobile insurance costs, up to $100 per month to assist the client in buying or leasing a passenger vehicle needed to meet basic transportation needs, and 50 percent of the remaining monthly income.

Supportive services

• Volunteers are recruited and trained to serve as mentors for parent clients. Mentors may advocate on behalf of the parent client and help her develop life skills, implement her employment plan, or obtain services and supports from the mentor, DWS, or civic organizations.
• Under a federal waiver, Medicaid eligibility is automatic for all FEP recipients.

IV. What have we learned in the past five years?

Financial assistance caseloads have declined

    Financial assistance caseload across the nation have been declining steadily since 1993 for combination of reasons. PRWORA passed in 1996. There is general agreement that both the economy and welfare policy have played a role, both nationally and in the individual states. The benefits to working families of the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) have certainly assisted. Utah's caseload (first AFDC and then FEP) has dropped by 54 percent since early 1993, from over 18,000 families to 8,656 in January 2002. Caseload reductions since the implementation of FEP amount to 30 percent, from 11,647 in August 1997, when FEP was first implemented, to 8,236 four years later. However, caseloads have begun to rise. Thirty-three states' TANF caseloads were higher in September 2001 than in March, when the recession officially began. Utah caseloads began rising from a low of 7,990 in June. ⁽¹¹⁾

Child and family poverty have declined over the decade

    There is wide agreement that the 1990s saw the earnings of single mothers increase dramatically, and family and child poverty decline. For example, in the nation as a whole, between 1993 and 1999, the child poverty rate fell from 22.7 to 16.9 percent. The "deep poverty rate" (those with incomes at or below 50 percent of the Federal Poverty Level) fell from 10.1 to 6.9.⁽¹²⁾ There is less agreement about the reasons for these developments. The economy, expanded Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), and welfare policies have all played roles. Few dispute the existence of a group of families who are worse off than before welfare reform and for whom both assistance and interventions are needed.⁽¹³⁾

Outcomes in rural areas with high unemployment and fewer resources are less positive

    In areas of higher unemployment and limited resources of all types, from intervention services to transportation, caseload reduction has been less dramatic. For example, in Utah's largely rural Eastern Region, including counties generally ranking in top five for high unemployment and poverty, caseloads have fallen since 1993 by only 21 percent, in contrast to 54 percent in the state as a whole.⁽¹⁴⁾

Many families are working.

    Although the economic slowdown currently appears to be having an effect on FEP family employment success, an average of from 20.5 to 26.5 percent of Utah's FEP caseload have had earnings since August 1997 when FEP was fully implemented. During that same period from 22.7 to 38 percent of cases that closed did so because of employment. ⁽¹⁵⁾

Working former FEP clients are generally earning low wages and lack health care benefits.

    According to the Congressional Research Service, jobs held by TANF recipients when they exit the program generally pay around $6.00 to $7.50 per hour.⁽¹⁶⁾ The Urban Institute, in its National Survey of America's Families, found 1999 median wages for recent welfare leavers were $7.15. ⁽¹⁷⁾ In a study of welfare leavers in Wisconsin, the Madison-based Institute for Research on Poverty found that, although earnings of tracked families grew from one year to the next, over three years, they never approached above-poverty levels for a family of three. The Center for Law and Social Policy surveyed state studies on welfare leavers and found both low wages and three out of four lacking employer-provided health insurance.⁽¹⁸⁾ Comparable wage data for former TANF families in Utah are not available; however, a study utilizing administrative data to follow a sample of Utah welfare leavers in 1994 through 1999 found that, for the average sized FEP family (three), 59 percent would have had incomes below 50 percent of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) and only two percent would have surpassed 150 percent of FPL.⁽¹⁹⁾

Welfare caseloads include families with serious and multiple barriers to employment

    During its 1997 General Session, the Utah Legislature mandated a study to examine the circumstances of families who would be likely to confront Utah's 36-month time limit. DWS contracted with the Social Research Institute at the University of Utah to conduct research targetting recipients who had received assistance for 24 months or more. They found that 80 percent of respondents had a physical or mental health barrier; 30 percent had a work barrier (poor work history); 32 percent lacked a high school diploma or equivalency; 42 percent had a child with a physical health problem; 23 percent had a child with a serious behavior problem; 74 percent had experienced severe domestic violence as adults; over 50 percent had been physically or sexually abused as children; and 46 percent had been involved with Child Protective Services. In all of these characteristics, researchers found that longer-term recipients have a higher incidence than the welfare population as a whole.⁽²⁰⁾

    Researchers evaluating Utah's Single Parent Employment Demonstration of 1993-1996 noted the challenges of serving multiple-problem families as one of the major findings of the SPED experience. They concluded that about one-third of clients had employment barriers needing some level of intervention and another one-third were at risk of needing extensive help if they were to obtain and retain work. They also predicted that, "As recipients are placed in unsubsidized employment and financial assistance caseloads decline, those left behind are likely to be recipients with more serious and multiple barriers to employment."⁽²¹⁾

Sanctions have played a slightly more significant role in case closures than time limits

    The first group of FEP families to reach Utah's 36-month lifetime limit did so in December 1999. That group included 436 families; the cases of 143 families were actually closed due to time limits. Forty-four percent qualified for extensions.⁽²²⁾ Since then, an average of 7.0 percent of all case closures per month are due to time limits for a total of 1,268 families as of January 2002. ⁽²³⁾

    Sanction closures occur when families have been determined to fail to participate in activities required in their employment plan. ⁽²⁴⁾ Since the FEP program began in August 1997, an average of 8.5 percent of monthly case closures have been due to sanctions, with sanctions becoming twice as common in recent months as in the early months of the program. The total number of such closures is 4,476 to January 2002. An unknown number of those have reopened when the parent began to comply with participation requirements. The outcomes and circumstances of only a small fraction of these families and those off assistance due to time limits are known (see just below).

Many families who have left welfare due to time limits or sanctions are not faring well.

    Subsequent to the above-mentioned investigation of long-term family circumstances, DWS commissioned SRI to study members of that same cohort who had since left the FEP program. Researchers interviewed 407 people and compared circumstances and characteristics of three groups-those who had left FEP for work, time-limits, and sanctions. They found that, as a group, the latter two groups differ significantly from the former group and are at substantial risk of deteriorating well-being. When compared with those who left for work, families closed for time limits or sanctions tended to . . .

• have come from more disadvantaged backgrounds;
• have had greater contact with the Child Protective Services system as children, including having spent time in foster care;
• have lower educational attainment;
• have had criminal convictions;
• have limited social support systems;
• have mental health problems, including higher rates of both depressive symptoms and Post-traumatic Stress Disorder;
• have suffered greater exposure to trauma, including domestic violence in the recent past;
• belong to a non-white racial or ethnic group;
• be unemployed;
• report declining well-being since they had left the system, including problems related to the loss of cash assistance such as "housing problems, trouble paying rent, eviction, phone disconnection, loss of a utility, inability to obtain medical and dental care for themselves and their children, inadequate clothing, lack of food, and a child leaving home."⁽²⁵⁾

A higher percentage of children receiving welfare assistance are living with relatives other than their parent(s) than before 1996.

    In FY 1999, 29 percent of families receiving cash assistance through TANF programs nationwide were "Child-only" cases, meaning that children were living with a "specified relative" rather than with a parent. Under TANF law, the head-of-household is exempt from time-limits and is excluded from work participation rate calculations. This phenomenon is emerging more slowly in Utah than in national statistics, but the percentage of FEP cases designated as "Specified Relative" is growing, nonetheless. When FEP began in August 1997, 11 percent of the total caseload was so designated; by August 2001, the percentage had nearly doubled to 21 percent. ⁽²⁶⁾

Little is known about child well-being

    Despite the facts that the 1996 Welfare Reform Law is one of the most heavily studied public policies and that the majority of TANF recipients are children, little is known about how children have fared under welfare changes. Of the few studies that exist, the Manpower Development Research Corporation (MDRC) found that, of pre-TANF welfare-work programs they considered, younger children appeared to experience some gains in progress at school and improved behavior when their usually single mother was able to increase disposable income. Programs that involved work, but which did not result in increased family income had no measurable positive impact on children.⁽²⁷⁾ In a recent review of welfare-to-work program evaluations, Child Trends found evidence of "increased behavior problems and lower academic achievement" among adolescents with parents enrolled in those programs. In the case of these older children, the negative impact was not mitigated by increased income.⁽²⁸⁾

Walsh & Weathers Research and Policy Studies wishes to express appreciation to the entities that provided direct assistance and information used in the preparation of this document and the companion "Major Reauthorization Issues" paper. These include the Center for Public Policy and Administration, the Social Research Institute, Graduate School of Social Work, and the Office of the President, University of Utah; the Utah Departments of Human Services and Workforce Services; Salt Lake Community Action Program; Utah Issues Center for Poverty Research and Action; and the Center for Law and Social Policy.

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1. Congress is already well on its way to reauthorizing and making positive changes to the Food Stamp Program and the subject of the Nutrition Title of both the House (H.R. 2646) and Senate (S. 1731) Farm Bills passed in recent months and now being considered in a conference committee. See "Utah Welfare Reform Reauthorization Round Table: Major Reauthorization Issues" paper, pp. 13-14.

2. Rebecca Blank and Ron Haskins, ed., The New World of Welfare, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001, pp. 8-11.

3. Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-U) was an optional federal program run in Utah until 1981. It served two-parent families with dependent children. Looking back, although it provided fiancial assistance to this group of families, AFDC-U disadvantaged intact families, as well as work. AFDC-U families were ineligible if the father worked 100 hours in a month. They were not eligible for the "30 + 1/3" income disregard. Where work was concerned, families were better off splitting up. The 100 hour rule was not overcome until 1993 when it was the subject of a federal waiver in Utah's Single Parent Employment Demonstration (SPED) program.

4. UDSS's Office of Management Audit tracked AFDC-U families after program elimination and found one year later almost one quarter of the mothers and children in those families had enrolled in the regular AFDC program as single parents. Another significant percentage had become homeless. Utah Issues, Directions , July 1982.

5. Fred V. Janzen, Mary Jane Taylor, and Shirley A. Weathers, An Evaluation of Utah's Single Parent Employment Demonstration Program, Salt Lake City: Social Research Institute, Graduate School of Social Work, University of Utah, July 1997.

6. These results were substantially less pronounced in the Roosevelt Office which served a rural area with among the highest unemployment and poverty rates in the state and benefitted far less from the economic boom of the 1990s.

7. Lynn A. Karoly, Jacob Alex Klerman, and Jeannette A. Rogowski, "Effects of the 1996 Welfare Reform changes on the SSI Program," in Blank and Haskins, ed., pp. 488-89.

8. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Summary of Provisions, Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (H.R. 3734)," August 7, 1996, p. 2.

9. In 1997 Congress passed the States Child Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) to cover more uninsured children.

10. A FEP family may qualify for an extension if the parent has a substance abuse problem or a physical or mental health condition that prevents work; is caring for a medically needy dependent; has work barriers due to a domestic violence situation; is under age 19; has completed education or training at the 36 ^th month, but needs additional time to obtain employment; moved to Utah after exhausting 36 months of TANF assistance in another state; or needs more time to complete an education or training activity through no fault of her own. Extensions may also be given to families to whom DWS did not provide services outlined in the client's employment plan.

11. Jodie Levin-Epstein, ed., CLASP Update, Washington, D.C.: Center for Social Policy and Law, January 2002. Caseload figures for Utah are from monthly data sheets issued by the Social Research Institute, Graduate School of Social Work, University of Utah, "Characteristics of Participants Receiving Financial Assistance," 1993-2002.

12. Greg J. Duncan and P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, "Welfare Reform and Children's Well-Being," in The New World of Welfare.

13. Ron Haskins, "Effects of Welfare Reform on Family Income and Poverty," Ibid.

14. Utah-specific research suggests that factors such as race and ethnic background is also affect employment outcomes, as do the shortage of intervention services in rural areas. Mary Jane Taylor, "Race and Regional Unemployment as Predictors of Exit from AFDC," Journal of Social Service Research, 1000; Shirley A. Weathers and William P. Walsh, Jr., Welfare Reform: The Impact on Native Americans in Utah's Uintah Basin, Center for Public Policy and Administration, University of Utah, February 2001.

15. Social Research Institute, 1997-2002.

16. Vee Burke, "Welfare Reform: An Issue Overview," Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, January 10, 2002.

17. Pamela Loprest, How Are Families That Left Welfare Doing? A Comparison of Early and Recent Welfare Leavers, Washington, D.C., The Urban Institute, April 2001.

18. Center for Law and Social Policy, "Comments to the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Regarding the Reauthorization of the Temporary Assistance Program for Needy Families (TANF) Block Grant," November 30, 2001.

19. Andrea Coon, Mcleans Geo-Jaja, and Garth Mangum, From Welfare Poor to Working Poor: Post AFDC/TANF Income in the State of Utah, Salt Lake City: Center for Public Policy and Administration, University of Utah, November 2000.

20. Amanda Smith Barusch and Mary Jane Taylor, Understanding Families with Multiple Barriers to Self-sufficiency, Social Research Institute, Graduate School of Social Work, University of Utah, February 1999. Findings in this study are consistent with a research summary, Eileen P. Sweeney, "Recent Studies Indicate that Many Parents Who Are Current of Former Welfare Recipients Have Disabilities or Other Medical Conditions," Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Washington, D.C. February 29, 2000.

21. Janzen, Taylor, and Weathers.

22. Around 30 percent received extensions for medical reasons, three percent because of a medical problem of a dependent, 1 percent because of domestic violence, and 10 percent for other reasons of hardship (extension definitions have been revised since then to be more specific). Information from DWS, January 2000 and the DWS Annual Report, 2001.

23. Social Research Institute, 2000-2002.

24. Ibid.

25. Mary Jane Taylor, Amanda Smith Barusch, and Mary Beth Vogel, Multiple Impacts of Welfare Reform in Utah: Experiences of Former Long-term Welfare Recipients, Social Research Institute, Graduate School of Social Work, University of Utah, June 30, 2000.

26. Social Research Institute, 1997-2001.

27. Ron Haskins and Wendell Primus, "Welfare Reform and Poverty," Welfare Reform and Beyond Policy Brief, Brookings Institution, July 2001.

28. Jennifer L. Brooks, Elizabeth C. Hair, and Martha J. Zaslow, Welfare Reform's Impact on Adolescents: Early Warning Signs, Child Trends, July 2001.